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Sino-Soviet Relations: 1949-1966 
Hiroto HIGASHLNO 
(1) Introduction 
This essay is concerned with the period in Sino-Soviet relations from 
1949 to 1966， breaking down the period into its mator political develop-
ments. Along with the process of chronological examination， 1 will 
discuss the two authors， Donald Zagoria and David Floyd， and their 
interpretations， tograsp a total picture of the relations as a consensus of 
their argument. At the same time， 1 will contrast their analyses to lead 
me to answer the following guestions. What was the nature of the 
dispute? What was the consistent and essential issue throughout the 
period? To what extent did ideological controversy and personaIity 
contribute to the dispute? Realizing the difficulty in drawing a clear 
distinction between these issues and various factors which might provide 
reciprocal impacts on the states' relations， 1 intended to examine these 
questions in this paper. 
(1りThePeriod of Friendship and Co-operation， 1949-55 
-Treaty of Friendship and Other Agreements (February 1950) 
As David Floyd mentioned， "whatever Stalin thought privately about 
the victory in China of a revol凶 onwhich owed relatively litle to Russian 函
aid and which was led by a man who was in no sense Moscow-train巴d，he J¥ 
had no choice in public but to welcome the development."1 The case was -=
quite the same for Mao and China. "(H)owever Mao regarded Stalin and 
the Russian Communists' treatment of China， the simple fact was that 
Russia was the only possible source of the considerable financial and 
1 David FJoyd， Mao against Khrushchev， p.10. 
economic and China must have if the new regime was to consolidate its 
grip on the country."l 
Under the circumstanc巴s，Mao went to Moscow to negotiate with 
Stalin two months after the proclamation of People's Republic of China in 
October 1949. Negotiations between the two governments lasted for two 
months， and the Treaty of Friendship， Alliance and Mutual Assistance 
was concluded in February 14， 1950. 
Besides the Treaty of Friendship， Alliance and Mutual Assistance， the 
negotiations concluded with the signature of (i) an agreement providing 
that after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan， and in any case not 
later than th巴endof 1952， the Soviet Union would transfer free of charge 
to the Chinese Government a1 of its rights in the joint administration of 
the Manchurian (Changchun) RaiJway， together with the property belong-
ing to the railway， and would withdraw its troops from the Port Arthur 
naval base， whose installations would be handed over to China; (i) an 
時間ementon the granting of long-term credits to the amount of 300，000， 
000 U.S. dollars by the USSR to China， to enable China to obtain indus-
trial， mining， and railway equipment from the USSR.2 
Notes were also exchanged on the issues of th巴independenc巴ofOuter 
Mongolia and the transfer of J apanese property mostly confiscated in 
Manchuria by the Soviets. Further agreements which were signed on 
March 27， 1950 included the establishment of joint-stock companies to 
exploit petroleum and non-ferrous metals and of a joint-stock civil avia-
tion company. In addition， a Sino-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed 0日
April 19， 1950.3 
The treaty and agreements which were concluded between Stalin and 
Mao were c10sely modelled on the previous treaty of August 14， 1945 that 
was concluded between Stalin and the Chiang Kai-shek. 1n order to 
1 ibid. p. 10. 
2 Keesing's International Studies， China and the Sovief Unum 1949 
84， p‘1. 
.1ohn Gittings， Surlley 01 the Sino.Soviet Di~ρute， p.43. 3 
??????
discern the relations between the two， I wilI bri巴自ydiscuss the Sino.Soviet 
Treaty of 1945. 
Main issues of the treaty inc1uded territorial controversy on Manchur. 
ia， Port Arthur， Dairen， Xinjiang， and Outer Mongolia. Regarding the 
three eastern provinces of Manchuria， Molotov， the Soviet Foreign 
Minister， declared China's ful sovereignty. Russia's pledge not to inter. 
fere in China's internal affairs extended to Xinjiang province.1 Stalin 
appended the treaty with the pledge that Soviet troops would begin 
withdrawal from Manchuria three weeks after the capitulation of ]apan 
and would complete the withdrawal in a maximum of three months! In 
a note to Molotov， Wang Shih.chieh， Chinese Foreign Minister， also 
dec1ared that China would agreεto recognize the independence of Outer 
Mongolia if， following the defeat of ]apan， a plebiscite of the people there 
confirmed their desire for independence! In reply， Molotov stated that 
Russia would respect the political independence and t巴rritorialintegrity 
of the People's Government of Outer Mongolia. 
With respect to the administrative city of Dairen， the military base of 
Port Arthur， and the main railways in Manchuria， the Soviet Union 
intended to hold the same privileges which she had before hεr defeat of 
the war with ]apan in 1905. Dairen was to be a free port open for the 
trade and shipping of al nations. Half of the port installations and 
equipment would be leased， free of charge， to Russia. The agreement 
stated that administration in Dairen be exercised by China. However， a 
Russian would be appointed as the chief of the Port by the manager of the 
Changchun Railway in agreement with the mayor of Dairen: Likewise， 
Port Arthur was to be under joint use as a naval base for the two powers. 四
ム
The civil administration which was managed by the Chinese Government ハ
had to take account of the Soviets' interest in time of eme明ency. 五
1 Henry Wei， China and Soviet Russia， p.182. 
2 ibid. p. 182. 
3 ibid. p. 182. 
4 ibid. p. 183. 
The railways in question were th日ChineseE呂sternRailway and the 
South Manchuria Railway， bothりfwhich were built by Czarist Russia for 
the purpose of imperialistic邑xpansion. The new agreement of 1945 
gral1ted that the two railw乱ys(The Changchull Hailway) be operat日d乱s
a purely commercial tr乳nsportationentεrpris日， with profits divided 
bεtween China and Russia.1 The general manager was to be a Russian， 
while the president of the board of directors was to be a Chinese. 01 
August 24， the Chin部 eN ational Defense COUJ1cil and the Legislative 
Yuan ratified the tr日atyand the related agreements， ten days after of their 
conclusion in Mosco¥¥人
The issues discussed in the treaty of 1950 were basically the same as 
those in the treaty of 1945.2 
( i) Manchuria. The Chan乞chunRailway was to be returned to China by 
the日ndof 1952 at the latest and without compensation， and the H.ussians 
were to give back Chinese property which was seized from the Japanese. 
( ji)Port Arthur. The Russian command was to be replaced by a 
Soviet笥Chinesecommission by the end of 1952. But the Chinesεwere to 
pay for instalIations. 
(ii) Dairen. N 0 change was agreed in the status of the port. But the civil 
administration， as well as some Japanese property， were to be given back 
to the Chinese. 
(iv) Xinjiang. The Russians recognized de facto Peking's sovereignty 
over the area，日ndsecured agreement to the creation of joint companies 
for the exploitation of Xinjinag's oil and mineral resources under Soviet 
日xperts.
四(v) Outer Mongolia. The Chinese had no choice but to recognize the 
五 independentstatus of this area， inwhich the Russians were firmly entren-
六 ched.
Among these司 themost touchy issue between the Soviets alld China 
ibid. p. 183. 
2 FoIlowing statements were basically from 0ム cit. Mao Against 
Khrushchev. pp.11-12. 
seerned to be the questio!1 of Outer Mongolia. In fact、KlausMehnert 
insisted that he has "!10 c10ubt that the leading COl11l11unists， including 
lVIao， desired eventually to annex Outer lVIongolia for the Chin慌て~ People' 
s Republic.'会1 To support the argurn日I1t，Kla us introc1uced a quote of 1¥1品。
il1 al1 interview with Edgar S110W in the summer 01 19:)6:付1tis China's 
immediate task to WII1 b在ckal th巴territorieswe have lost， not merely to 
。nthis side of the Great Wal1プ(Both1nnεr and defend OUl♂ 
lt出relations
。uterlVIongolia are situatα1 b台yondthe Great 
As a m註tter01 f読むt.Peking went furthcr to 
with Outer lVIongolia. In July 1950 ambassador日wereexchanぷed.A year 
later Peking dispatched a delegation to Ulan Bator for the celebration of 
thεthirtieth anniver日ary()f the lVIongoli註nrεγolution: six months later 
dispatched '1 further del巴gationto the state funぞr乱Iof Choibalsang. 1n 
September 1952， Zhou Enlai and Tsedenbal met in 恥Toscow，and a tτipaγm 
tite pact ¥vaぉconcludedon the building of the railw'1Y乱11ひngthe Soviet 
Union， China，投ndthe Mongolian People'日Repl1blic.Klaus gueE治edthヨt
"St'1lin was lOt particularly interested in the projεct. bec'1use Ul'1n B呂tor
had alreadv been link巳dbv rail with the Soviet Union since 1949. and 
therefore he l1ight feel that was sufficient円 2 StaJin did 10t give CO!1sent 
until n日gotiatiol1sbetween Zhou and Tsedenbal were fairly f'1r '1dvanced 
11 Octo ber 1ヲ52司 theChinese Government signed a tenψye計rtrでatywith 
Tsedenb品1in Peking in an attempt to extend economic and cnltur呂i
? ? ? ? ?
cooperatlOn. 
-After Stalin's Era (1953-55) 
"Khrushchev is l'1ter reported to have said th'1t the 'main reasol1' for 
his visit to Peking in 1954 was 'to remove causes of tension.'吋 Khrush-
chev observed that "Stalin had jeopardized Sino-Soviet rel'1tiol1s by 
ぞdemandingtoo ml1ch in retum for aicl，' and lVI'1o had b巴en'extremely 
1 Klaus lVIεhner仁Pehngand 井fosι'OW..p. 264. 
2 ibid. p. 264. 
3οiう cit.，Survの theSino-Soviel Di.ゆute.，p.57. 
embittered' by Stalin's insistence on joint-stock cOl11panies and mining 
and industrial concessions."l Therefore， in less than two years after 
Stalin's death， the relations between the two COl11l11unist countries were to 
a certain degree restored with the efforts of Khrushchev. 1、hus，the 
beginning of 1956 saw th巴Moscow.Pekingaxis as a powerful combination 
in world politics which would grow stronger rather than break Up.2 
(11) The Beginnings of Disagreement， 1956-1957 
…The 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) 
1) the repudiation of Stalin in Khrushchev's secret speech of February 
24-25， 1956 
an uncomfortable analogy with the cult of Mao Zedong 
2) Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence as the代fundamental
principle" of Soviet diplol11acy and on the "parliamentary road" as a 
viable means of transition to socialism 
* 
distortion of Marxist.Leninist doctrine 
refiection of an incorrect and over.optimistic evaluation of the nature 
of US il11perialism and at the sal11e til11e under田巴valuationof support 
for national.liberation movements 
* 
* 
-The Crisis in Poland and Hungary (1956) 
Chinese statements basically criticized the policy's implication of 
Soviet 刊bignational chauvinism" on the Hungarian and Polish crises. 
China approved of national variations in the road to socialism in such 
countries as Poland and Yugoslavia. 
??????
For example， Mao was reported to have urged the Poles to "follow 
absolutely the search for an autonOI11OUS internal policy and develop their 
own social system as Yugoslavia had done" in talks with the Polish 
deleヌateOchab (First Secretary of the Polish W orkers' Party) during the 
ibid. p.57. 
。/入 cit.，Mao a/{ainst Khn仏、hchevリ p.31.
1 
2 
8th Congress of the CCP (Sep. 15 27).1 In October when the Polish crisis 
worsened， China rejected a Soviet proposal to condemn Poland at a 
meeting of fraternal p呂rties.2
The Hungary crisis seemed to be rreated similarly by the Chinese at 
長rst;however， the line changed abruptly as soon as the N agy government 
declar日dneutrality for Hungary and proposed to withdraw from the 
Warsaw Pact. China now welcomed Soviet intervention in Hungary. In 
summation， China's strategy was to support polycentrism in communist 
nations in order to balance power in the Soviet dominated bloc to the 
extent that it did not weaken the pow巴rof socialist camp as a whole. 
Zhou Enlai， during the tour of the Soviet Union， Poland， and Hungary in 
January 1957， stressed the importance of Soviet leadership of the socialist 
bloc. 
The I¥10scow Me巳ting(November 1957) 
The MoscowァMeetingof Representatives of Communist and Workers' 
Parties (Nov. 14-19， 1957) discussed the folIowing topics: economic devel. 
opment of the bloc， the struggle for peac巴andsocialism， relations among 
communist parties， and current international problems. 1n his speech on 
November 14， Mao stated that the Soviet Union should occupy a leading 
role as the head of the states of the socialist camp and of the community 
of communist and workers' parties.3 Mao's emphasis on Soviet bloc 
Ieadership completed the reversal of Chin巴sepolicy during 1956..7 towards 
equality of bloc relations， much to the disappointment of Poland and 
Thus， "revisionism" and "dogmatism" were condemned as 
dangerous trends in the communist movement. 
??????Hungary. 
-Mao's Moscow Speech U、Jovember18， 1957) 
Though not fully published， Mao seem吋 toadvocate " a military 
印• at.， Survey of the Sino.Soviet D坤ute.，p.69. 
ibid. p.70. 
ibid. p.73‘ 
?
?
??
solution of the contradIction出betweensocialism and capitalism" In this 
speech.' The perception of lVIao is gre品tlyrelated to improvements in 
Soviet str邑口gth.~.in particuiar， the launching of the first sputnik 
and his understanding that imperialist colonial policy， including the 
Chinese Revolution， h呂clfailed sInce the end of the Wγorld War I1.As such‘ 
the Chinese at that time recognized the internationaI situation with ful 
conficlεnce that the East prevails over the West 
However， the Soviet vi巴W 時particularlyin terms of the impact of the 
development of advancecl weapons such as sputnik (Oct 4， 1957) and 
ICBIvls (Au必26，1957) in world politics~"showed differences from the 
Chinese. The Soviet leadership was more reluctant to use these as 
conv巴ntionalweapons and therefore could not become as optimIstic of the 
Eastern str乳tegicsuperiority in the nuc]εar war age aおおlaodiιThiswas 
the crux of the Sino.Soviet deb呂teover tactics towards the ¥Vest， i九アhich
was to 100m even in subsequent years. 
Zagoria's Interpretation 
With respect to Soviet Global Strategy， the following two points which 
Kbrushchev introducecl at th日20thCongress were importan仁 First.he 
mentioned that p巴acぱulcoexistence was not a mere tactical expedient 
but a "fundamental principle" ()f Soviet for日ignpolicy.2 He furthermore 
conciudecl that there was no altεmative to peaceful coexistence :引either
p巴acefuicoexistence or the most clestructiv巴warin history. There is no 
third way." Second， Khrushchev modified t:he Marxist.Leninist dogma 
that wars are inevitable as long a日capitaIismsurvives that "war is no1: a 
四 fatalisticin日vitability.""A日such，Khrushchev believed in the possibility 
r-， to progre部 alonga "peaceful reiァolutionary"line. 
o As a successor whu denied the brutal clictatorship of Stalin， Khrush恥
) 
chev had to unifv the international communist bioc with less viol巴I1t
ibid. p.79. 
2 Zagoria， Donald S. The Sino.Soviet Conflict 1956.196]， p.40. 
:1 ibid噌 p.40.
measures and coercive power， whiJe allowing for the c1i百erentnationa 1 
perspectives ancl interests of the various communist states and parties 
Thus， Khrushchev's posture seemed to be based upon a comparatively 
Urεalistic" perspεctive， vvhich in Mao's eyes cam日 tobe rel1ected as品
"revisioni日t"けr"right" wing strateiミy.
1n 11巴me品ntime，the pりliticaldeveloj)m日ntof the CCP between June 
and N ovember ] 957 w剖且lsoinlj)ortant in considering the raclical shift to 
"1日ft"wing policy both in domestic and external j)olicy of China岨 The
氏、sultsweどと illcarn呂t引1in the policy of the "Gr巴atLeap Forward" with 
the introduction of communes and the abandonment of the Bandong spirit 
effective since 1954， Zagoria analyzed the main reasons uf the shift to be 
consequences of the "hundred flowers movement" ancl a desperate eco 
nomic situatiωn， mainly du記 tocollectivization警 inthe summer of 1957. 
h肝 riaconcluclecl that "the left wing gained the ascenclancy in the 
summer ancl fal of 1957 after the clramatic failure of the 'hundred日owers'
campaig口、 andadvocated a breakneck pace ()f economIc clevぜloprnentas 
the をo11lyway out.'・吋
Floyd's Interpretation 
Floyd shared Zagoria's idea on Khrushchev's view towards war恥rith
capitalism; that is， Khrushchev consiclered that wars were out!awed and 
that th日communistworld must even think in terms of collaboratioI1 with 
the capitalists，' This originatecl fr011 the recognition that a war with 
modern weapons仏!ouldmean the end of communism as well as capital白
1日1.
With respect to the ambivalent stance of China in th巴worldcommu一回。
nist arena， Floyd had the same perspective as ZagorIa: "(T)hey (the :: 
Chinese) supported the apparently contradictory demands f()r unity in the 
camp and greater auto!1omy [or its members，"3 
ibid， p，68， 
2ορ， ci/" /14α() against Klmωhchev.， p.34. 
3 ibid， p.44. 
1、heinternal causes which drove the Chinese to the left. in Floyd'日
analysis， were also quite similar to those of Za只oria:"a serious economic 
crisis as well a日 awave of opposition and criticism which had been 
released by Mao Zedonピ日 hundredflower日， experiment川
(IV) The Beginnings of Disagreement， 1958-1959 
--Yu宗明laviaBecomes the "Mirror" of Revisionism (1958) 
11 1958， Yugoslavia first assumed ideological neutrality in Chinese 
criticism of the Soviet Union. 1ncreasingly however. the word "Yu符os-
lavia" wa日synonymouswith the words "Soviet Union" in Chinese use of 
terminology; just as from 196()-1 on. "Albania" in Soviet parlance was 
often interchan又eablewith "China." 
China's first major criticism of Yugoslavi乱 appearedin the PeopJe's 
Daily on March 5， 1%8 as a resj)onse to her shift in relation to Soviet 
policy. 1'he ch昌racteristicsof the event were that whereas Soviet criti目
cism of Yugos!avia left the door open for a future improvement in 
日latiollS，the Chinese argu巳dthat uncりmpromisingstrugどい must he 
waged against Yugoslavian revisionisl1， and that there was no j)ossibility 
that the latter would change for the better.2 11 September 1958， China 
withdrew her ambassador from Belgrade. 1n January 1959噌 Peking
published a bitter attack on Yugos]avia's attitude toward the 1'aiwan 
question. 
1ー'he1'aiwan Straits Cl・isis(AugustゅOctober195紛
二‘ Presumablyalarmed at Sino-Soviet di百erences，Khrushchev had an 
)L unscheduled visit (July :31 August :3) to Pekin誌andtalks with the Chinese 
leaders. However the communique issued at the end of his trip failed to 
mention the 1'aiwan issue at all. CHinese propaganda on the liberatiol1 
of 1'aiwal1， which had C]iod down during and after Khrushchev'日visit，was 
ibid. p.41も.
2 Op. cit.， SIIIl'CY of t/ie Sino-Souiet Dおt/{te.，p‘85. 
revived in mid-August， and on Au応ust2::1 Chinese shelling of Quemoy 
began.1 
.'The Great Leap Forward (1958-9) 
NucJear Wγeapons and Defence (1958-9) 
As Sino-Soviet discord became tense from 1957--8， Chinese efforts to 
acquire nuc1ear status became more intensive. During 1958 Chinese 
leaders began to publicize for the first time their conviction that China 
would acquire nuclear weapons in the not too distant future.2 At the 
Enlarged Conference of the Military Affairs Committee in May-July 1958， 
Mao declared that it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and 
hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years' time.3 
ー-1、heSino.lndian Border Dispute (1959) 
The incidents which took place on the Sino-Indfan border in July-
October 1959 were relatively mInor， involving a few isolat巴dskinnishes 
anc1 the d巴athof nine Indian policemen and one Chinese solc1ier (in the 
cIash on October 21)，" Accorc1ing to thc lndian account however， minor 
disputes with China had occurred at intervals ever since 1954， and Chinese 
forward movements for expansionism along the border had been noted 
since 1958. The legality of movements by both sides depenc1s upon the 
view onεtakes of the legality of their claims to the disputec1 areas. 
The Soviet Union regarc1ed the border conftict of 1959 as a deliberate 
manoeuvre by China， aimed at "torpedoing the relaxation of international 
tension" on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. This Soviet's view : 
seemed to be derived from a fl1ndamcntal perceptional difference with 7¥ 
ibid. p.90. 
2 ibid. p.] 03‘ 
:3 ibid. p. 104. China's first hyc1rogen bomb succ巴ssfullyexploded in 
June 17， 1967. 
4 ibid. p. 110. 
China 011 the char呂cterof the Indian government‘ China s呂wlndia丘S呂
capitalist country led by a r母乳ctionarybomヌεoisie，while the Soviet 
Union did not see it as such‘as was d巴scribedin Khn…lShchev's tr1umph註nt
tour in 105;) and following aid worth over US$:375 million in July 195弘
"Khrushchev's vi8it to Pekin只(1959)
Khrl1日hchev'scon日日cutivevisits to Pekinロin195時and195ヲunderlined
the serious deterioration in Sino均Sovietrelations during these years. 
Khrushchev in these y日ar8was a詰trollgbelieyer in peaceful coexistenc巴
between the West and the East and hence did not support lV1ao's lefti，きt
adventurism 呂t alL rお~ut じhim乱礼lし， headi ng for 1 日f此t
cally and abroad， did lot favor Khrushche号、日ttemptsat託 Suviet.U‘S岳
detente， because ぉhefeared increasing isol自tion，diminishing the effective 
V設lueoI alliance with the Soviet Union，且nd cost to pursuing her 
own policy in乱nadvers官官nvironment.' Under the circumstanc記s.the 
Taiwan issue emerged as 抗日vmbolof the djf付 encesbetween Chin司自nd
the Sovi巴tUnion， though th日reis no indication that China. either then 0τ 
at any other time日inc日J950，planned to laul1ch品日erousmi!itary invasion 
in order to liberate the islan(J.2 
Zagoria's Interpretation 
The reasons for Khrushchev's criticism of China's de，'巴]opmentof 
communes were， inZagoria's discussIon， rooted in its lack of material 
incentives and the Soviet's' ()WI1 ul1successful experimenr with日gricul，
tural communes in the perioc] immediately aft巴rthe 1917 revolution. In 
his N ovember 14 theses 011 the Sovi日tSeven Ye旦rPlan， Khrushchev 
七 insertedthe passag巳 "VladimirIlyich Lenin had t日ughtthat without 
material incentives it is impossibl日tり leadtens and tens ()f milljol1s of 
??? ???
??
? ????? ???、??????????????
?
??
?
?
??
??
??
?
?
ibid. p. 116. 
2 ibid. p. 117‘ 
:3 ot. cit. The SinoふJIIetConfiict 19561961. p.99 
With re釘al工lsto in buildin符upsocia list stat巴tトroughcomη1unes， 
Khrushche￥， like Stalin， did not. favour accelθrating the transition ¥γith 
excesslVeおpl!cd.Hoth Soviet leaders feared th且tpremature cornmuniza 
tion could lead to mass dissid世nce¥;vithin the system and help enemies of 
Communism exp!oit the unstablεsituation.' 
As was su蕊gestedby the case of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1958， 
Peking se巴medto want to exert greateτpJεssures O!1 each opponent than 
did Moscow.2 Concerning the Sino.lndian border dispute， the U.S.S.R. had 
taken a neutral positiυn between a Commnnist and a nmトCommunist
state， a position which Peking undoubteclly r巴gard日das a betrayal of 
"proletarian internationalisrn.円 Thesedifferent postures of the two big 
commllnist countries were based 01 their own perceptions of revolution. 
ary stategy. FOlゅ theChinese， Khrushchev、s80ft policy to the "¥九iestwas 
hazardous primarily becauおeit would dampen the revollltionary spirit of 
peoples throughollt the world.' On the other hand， Khru日hchevseemed to 
believe that the revollltion wOllld be a long‘te1'm affair which cOllJd not be 
promoted aggressively in the nuclear era，G 
Floyd's Interpretation 
Floyd analyzed Khrushchev's China poIicy from the begi11ning ()f 1958， 
ancl separated it into two main elements.6 First， itwas to increase the 
scale of Soviet eco!1omic， a11d pussibly military， aid to China， thus reassur. 
i1g the Chinese of Russi日nf1'iendship and support and i11creasing Rllssian 
penetration of China's economy. Second， itwas to oust孔1aoZedong and 
the leftist elements from the Chinese leadership. CJearly， Khrushchev 
failed in both attempts. 
1 ibid， p. ll9. 
2 ibui. p， 110. 
3 ibid. p. 28:1. 
4 ibid. p. 244. 
3 ibid. p. 284. 
ら op.じit‘ MaoaglIlIst Khrushchev. p.も;1.
._L. 
/¥ 
五
(V) The Beginning of Open Controversy， 1960-62 
-The Opening of Polemics (1960) 
The first six months of 1960 witnessed a steady escalation of the 
Sino-Soviet dispute_ The dispute at this time was headed by ideological 
issues and practical strategy as to how to live with imperia!ists. Long 
Live Leninism， published a month before the Paris summit meeting， was 
China's first comprehensive attack in theoretica! terms on the Soviet 
Furthermore， an editorial in the Peゅよ凶 Dailya week later 
wrote in this way: .寸hefact is...even after the Camp David talks and 
even on the eve of the East-West summit conference， we s配 nochange at 
al in substance in US imperialist war po!icy， inthe policy carried out by 
the US government and by Eisenhower personally."2 
The Soviet replied to Long Live Leninism in a speech by Otto 
Kuusinen on April22， 1960. "Peaceful coexistence， inLenin's time as now， 
was the basis of Soviet foreign po!icy， and it had been creatively devel. 
oped by出eCPSU at its 20th and 21st Congress.吋
position.' 
-The Bucharest Conference (]une 1960) 
The Bucharest Conference turned out to provide a dramatic preview 
of the international meeting， airing Sino・Sovietdifferences before an 
audience of fifty party delegations， with a violent clash between the 
Chinese delegate Peng Chen and Khrushchev.4 The attendance at Buchar-
est was weighted in the CPSU's favour. 
In the final day of the Conference， Khrushchev raised such explosive 
issues as the Sino.lndian border dispute， military cooperation， the Great 
Leap Forward， and Peng Dehuai's dismissal.5 The Bucharest Conference 
???????
p.120. 仰• cit. Survey 01 the Sino.Soviet Diゆute.
ibid. p. 120. 
ibid. p. 121. 
ibid. p. 123. 
ibid. p. 124. 
???
also witnessed the emergence of Albania as single supporter of China. 
The Withdrawal of Sovi巴tExperts (August 1960) 
1n mid.July of 1960， a So¥riet Central Committee Plenum claimed to 
rebu百left.wingsectarian deviation and manifestations of narrow nation. 
alistic tendencies.l 1n August， the withdrawal of al 1390 Soviet 
apecialists in China occurred. 1n agreements of August 1958 and February 
1959， the Soviet Union undertook to assist in the construction of 125 
industrial projects (in addition to the 211 Soviet.aided projects in progress 
or completed). But Sino-Soviet trade declined by over 50% in 1961， and 
has operated since 1963 at a rate less than in any previous year during the 
1950-60 period.2 
1n April 1961 it was agreed that the outstanding trade deficit could be 
paid 0仔overfour years， tobe finally liquidated in 1966. China preferred 
to liquidate the deficit as soon as possible， and al Soviet credits were 
finally repaid by the first quarter of 1965.3 The consequence was the shaq】
decline of China's foreign trade with Soviet Union and East European 
nations to under 30% in 1963， whereas in 1955 it amounted to almost 70%.4 
??????
--The Moscow Conference (November 1960) 
-The 22nd Congress of the CPSU (October 1961) 
1n his speech to the Congr在日s，Zhou Enlai protested that "open unilat-
eral condemnatjon of a fraternal party does not make for unity...and could 
not be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach.吋 1nMarch 1962， 
an apparent lul in the dispute set in， and both Sino-Soviet and Soviet. 
Albanian polemics declined sharply over the next six months. 
ibid. p. 129. 
ibid. p. 13l. 
ibid. p‘1:-r1. 
ibid. p. 134. 
ibid. p.154 
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Zagoria's Interpretation 
According to Zagoria， on巳ofthe controversial issues of April 1960 
between Moscow and Peking was the question of peac巴fulcoexistence.' 
Gaining confidence in a peaceful triumph in the long run， together with the 
increasing fear of nuclear war， the Soviets desired a detente. The 
Chinese， how巴ver二didnot accept the Soviet coexistence tactics. To the 
Chinese， putting "peace" before "just" wars was bad tactics.2 
Then， how did Soviet view the non.inevitability of war in their strate. 
gic thinking? Zagoria answered the question with three points.3 First， the 
Russians had exhibited both in doctrine and in action a be!ief that the 
likely costs ()f general war in the nuclear era are prohibitive. Second， they 
appeared to believe they could attain their objectives in the middle run 
without the risk of general or Jocal war. Third， Moscow's conservative 
thinking on war seemed intimately related to the instability of the so-
called balance of terror. Thus， the perceptional gap existed mainly in the 
view of warfare in the nuclear age. In fact， Khrushchev reportedly added 
in the Bucharest Conference that the Chin巴seknew litle about the real-
ities of modern war: 
Floyd's Interpretation 
Zagoria intended to explain the nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute with 
perceptional c1ifference in the importance of nuclear arsenal in modern 
warfare and following tactical differences in propelling the international 
communist movement. Basically sharing the same perspective as Zagor-
ia， Floyd under!in日dChina's strong anti-imperia!ist sentiment， particular-= Iytowards the U.S.， with accounts of three prominent Chinese figures 
!¥ 
At a meeting in Moscow in February 1960， Kang Sheng provided a 
catalogue of America's "double-dealing" and '¥var plans" in various parts 
1 0ρ. cit. The Sino-Soviet Crmflict 1956…1961. p.301. 
2 ibid. p. 305. 
3 ibid. p. 312. 
4 ibid. p. :l25. 
。fthe world.1 In a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions on 
June 1960， Zhou Enlai said: "Peace can never be achieved by begging it 
of imperialism."2 In the same conference of June 1960， the Chin巴町
delegate Liu Chang-sheng， Vice-Chairman of the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions and a Vice-Chairman of the WFTU， mentioned the Chinese 
attitude toward war in greater detail: "(I)t was true to say that there was 
a possibility of preventing the電imperialists'from unleashing such a war， 
although 'it is entirely wrong to believe that war can be eliminated for 
ever while imperialism stiI exists'.吋
Thus， Floyd's work suggested that how the Chinese feared being 
threatened by imperialists. Presumably， China feared this more than the 
Soviet Union did. It is therefore safe to believe， though ironically， that 
China's excessive anxiety against the U.S.， a comrnon adversary with the 
Soviet Union， helped to create a division in the camp. 
(VりIntensificationof the Conflict， 1962“64 
-The Sino-Soviet Border (1962-64) 
The Czarist Russia acquired vast areas in the Far East， previously 
under at least nominal Chinese suzerainty， through the treaties of Aigun 
(1858) and of 1込king(1860).4 (The Qing overnment refused to ratify the 
treaty of Aigun， but its essential provisions were included and enlarged in 
the treaty of Peking.) These included al the territory north of the Amur 
river and east of the Ussuri river-now known as the Soviet Maritime 
??????
Province‘ The treaty of Ili (1881) ceded part of Chinese Turkestan 
Republic-now Xinjiang-to Russia. lt is now incorporated in the Kaza-
khstan Soviet Republic. Part of the 1500 mile Soviet-Xinjiang frontier has 
Survey 01 
印• cit. Mao against Khrushchev. p. 98. 
ibid. p. 100. 
ibid. p. 101. 
FoIlowing information in this section is based on 印• cit. 
the Sino酬SovietDi~ψute. pp. 158-161. 
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1n ivIalγh 1963、t1eChinese ひvernment抗rststated th呂tthe 
treaties of 
and th旦t
and Ili among others wむre 日記qu託1treatiεsf 
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frontier呂rran広告m百nts宅 thei!Dm色di註tecau忠告 of se記msto have 
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of Shih-z呂jin EJ:i7-42， Since 1949 China h現日記xercisedeffective 
control of Xinjiang， anc1 has sou認htto sinify the Kazakh，二呂nd
other semi-nomadic minoriti正治 there on a considerablむsc説Ie.ドIrstfron-
tier incidε¥ver合admittedby both sides in 1960 and after in 1962. 
The 1むすととう{piosiveissue of ()uter Mao 
m 19ふ1，and was played l1p 
Chin♂総
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Treaty， M説。 r日V日al忠仁1th設tChina had託ttεmpteclto reopen the que品tiひれ
durinεKhrushchev's visit to Peking in 1954‘ 
一--Atternptsat Mediation 09(2) 
The Cuban Crisis and thεSino今lndianWar (1962 63) 
China's argument. that the Soviet Unio!l was guilty ()f刊乳dv巴nturi日n1"
in sending the missiles to Cub呂ー呂ndof "capitul呂tionism"in withdrawing 
the11， touched the Soviet leaclership on a sensitive spot.' 
The 1、est-Ban and the Op号nBrξak (July 1ヲ6:1)
Th記 d巴iinitivebreak bεtween China and the SovIet Union finallv 
1 ihidιp.176. 
occurr己diロJuly196:i， with the 
denunciation by China‘the inde長n.itepostponementβf SimトS0¥'Ietbil品ト
， Jts of the、Cl、日st-B司n
ひnboth sides.' overt and the opεning of ε1'a1 
them to overvie¥v aぉcriesof disputes， 
Into six aおpεcts. ¥tverとecollomic、milit註ry.cliplomatic‘ two 
agぞs()f revolution，い¥'0different men， and ideの]ogicalfeatures.2 
these，ドJoydsεems to p!ace 1在日ssignificance on the ideoJogical aspect th乱n
the ro]e of tvvo personal cults weight巴d‘a日th己主itleof hi日bけりk
In his unde下standing，"ideolo夜yhas always played a自在condaryrole in t1ε 
dispute.吋
Cautioning the reader t引 regardthe clispute between the Soviet Union 
and China日s a dispute between the two leaders，ドloydneverth仔
!とS8maintained tI1alれitwould be号 wrongto りretheεxlent to 
18 a 担任官ction th日以il]f]icti n立charactc[sof thcse two 
hold sway日re
which the 
men叫すher巴asonwas that "(tlhe rεgime泊。verwhich 
highly centraIized dictator日hipsin which 1.he personality of the 11白nat th日
top is of vastly t!lOl'e importance than in the ca問 ofthe Jeader of乱
democratic regime.吋 Basically，I agree with hIs idea; "too l1npreclictable 
呂ndtoo arbitrary'哨 Khrushchevwas詰tronglysuspiciou日 ofMao. a 
dictator in a highly cent:raliz日正11ポio凡 ashis ()wn remarks <Iescribed th品t
"(d)uring my (Khrushchev)吋sitto Peking， the atmosphere was typic呂ly
Everyone ¥V昌sunbelievably courteous and ingratiating， but 1 
saw through their hypocris"イηInhis apprehension， he went further to say 
Orien!:aL 
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ibid. jl. 184， 
For m01'e details， see ど砂.cit. ldao againsl KflJ淵 hchev.pp. 194~ 199. 
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that "it's always di伍cultto know what the Chinese are really thinking. It' 
s difficult to figure out whether China is really for or against peaceful 
coexistence." 1 
(VIりThePost-Khrushchev Period， 1964-66 
-Vi巴tnamand Sino-Soviet Relations (1965-67) 
An account O!1 the People's Daily of February 20. 1967 cO!1sidered the 
proposal by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to force the Vietnamese people 
to surrender as a big conspiracy.2 1n April 1967. the Chinese argued that 
代oppositionto Soviet revisionism was the most effective aid to the 
Vietl1amese people， and criticized those people who call themselves 
Communists but._parrot the line of the Soviet revisionists and spare no 
efforts to preach united action with them_"3 
(VIII) Conclusion 
As 1 examinecl Sino-Soviet relations from 1945 to 1966 with main 
political events ancl two writers' analyses， there were a variety of aspects 
in this dispute. These included tεrritorial controversy on Outer Mongolia， 
borcler questiol1 of Xinjiang， the ideological issue. and security strategy_ 
More complicatedly， there seemed to be 110 single funclamental issue. 
which was disputed throughout the p巴riod，but a focus 011 the controversy 
seemed to show arbitary chan只es. Futhermore， the ideologIcal contro-
versy， the most touchy and crucial aspect through which we understand 
一 the essence of the dispute withil1 the same bloc， was conducted through 
;九 "estoriclanguage." making it日xtremelydifficult for outsiclers to follow. 
HO¥vever. if one puts what seems to be the "root" of the dispute into 
ihid. p.473 
2 Summary of the article is available in Ot_ cit. Survey 01 the Siuo 
Soviet Dis戸ute.p.269. 
3 ibid_ p. 260. 
historical context， the nature of Sino-Soviet relations， which took shape 
during this period， apprears with certain c1arity. ln other words， the 
essence of their relations existed far beyond either the time span of post 
1949 or understanding within the framework of communism. For exam-
ple， China's border i日suewith the Soviets can be traced back to the Treaty 
of Aigun in 1858 on record. In addition， inMao's mind， annexation oi 
Outer Mongolia had already巴xistedas part of his political agend in 1936. 
Moreover， strong distrust of Moscow-Ied revolutionary line must have 
already exist巴din the 1920s， as， despite "authoriative" guidance from 
Moscow， numerous at巴mptsto勺iberate"urban China ended in total 
failure at that time. 
Thus， China's revolutionary success wa日heavilyreliant on Mao's own 
militarily strategy， political ideology， and personal cult. Ther巴fore，it is 
safe to believe in the possibility of clash between strong personalities 
Mao against either Stalin or Khru日hchev.wh巴neverthese leaders wer巴
faced with inherent political agenda such as territory Issues and discussed 
abstract concepts， their views of which originated in their own experi 
ences and/or personality. As such. varioLls controver日ialfactors seemed 
to be amplified by dictators with strong cults of personal and by the 
"esoteric" language that they used‘ 
This research eventually suggested to me the difficulty in drawing a 
"neat" picture of Sino但Sovietrelations based on sound logic、andemphas. 
ized the need to utilize long standing historical perspective. 1t also 
suggested the danger ()f states in which personal cult could matter more 
than anything else， and barren discussion， usin広引esoteric"communist 
language， which could not solve any concrete issues at all. 
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